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Paternalism in the Law of Marriage
JEFFREY EVANS STAIME
I. WHO SHOULD DEFImN A MARRIAGE?
"If contractual marriage is a meeting of the minds, then we should be glad that
Jeff Stake and Eric Rasmusen are not applying for a license."' Kathryn Abrams is
right; Eric's mind and mine never did meet on some important points. But her line
bears repeating not just because it is clever. It exemplifies an important aspect of
the traditional view of marriage; it reflects the common notion that it is society's
prerogative to decide what constitutes a good marriage. Professor Abrams did not
say that society should prevent or discourage our collaboration, but in her view the
differences between Eric and me are too deep for society to be glad about our
joining forces.2 Never mind that Eric and I might be perfectly happy to share the
production of an article in spite of important differences. In the traditional view, it
is not for us to decide whether we should form a partnership. Society sets the
criteria.
It is amazing how deeply entrenched this notion remains. At a small dinner table
of lawyers and biologists attending the 1998 Gruter Law and Biology conference,
Ira Ellman, who is well-known for his family law writings3 and his influential
position with the American Law Institute, brought up the topic of divorce law. In
the ensuing discussion, nearly everyone present, scientist and lawyer alike (the
predictable exception being a free-thinking economist4), appeared to assume that
if we were clever enough in writing the law (and applying it later) we could create
rules for marriage and divorce that would be appropriate for everyone. The
discussion exposed a nearly universal assumption that it should be up to society,
rather than private parties, to define "marriage." Is it impossible for people to
assume that there is no right answer? Is it impossible for people to assume that
there is no correct or even best way to look at marriage?
The point of our paper,' of course, was that while society holds the power to
define marriage, it ought not continue to exercise that power as fully as it does.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I thank Michael
Alexeev, Susan Williams, Amy Wax, Ken Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, and Ximen Wolf for
helpful comments.
1. KathxynAbrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the Traditional Family,
73 IND. L.J. 517, 517 (1998) (responding to Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the
Veil ofIgnorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998)). From the
absence ofEric's name on this response, Professor Abrams might be tempted to respond that the
marriage between Eric and me has already failed. In fact, the explanation is that Eric is already on
to other projects. ["I agree with what Jeff says in this reply, but he wrote it"--EYR.].
2. Ifwe had agreed more fully, society could be happy about our "marriage." But why is our
disagreement a problem? She points to no harm done by our failure to agree.
3. E.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
4. David W. Barnes, of the University of Denver (Well, OK, I admit he is a law professor
too.).
5. See Rdsmusen & Stake, supra note 1.
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Instead, appropriately limited legislation should delegate power to couples,
allowing them to personalize their legal relationship in ways that are not currently
allowed. We did not argue that any and all marital agreements should be
enforceable. We included a substantial discussion of the limits we would put on
private ordering.6
The basic argument for private ordering is simple. Behavior during marriage
depends partly on incentives. The rules of marriage and divorce create incentives.
If one set of rules applies to all couples, all married people face the same set of
incentives (however complex and contingent). However, couples differ in what they
want out of a marriage and how they want each other to behave during their
marriage. Some hope their marriage will join together two lives while they retain
a fierce financial independence.7 Other couples may want to merge more
completely, gaining some financial security from their marriage. Alternatively, some
couples might include one person that desires security and one that wishes to
provide it. Different couples need different packages of incentives. Therefore, some
couples would benefit from the law's enforcement of rules tailored to their hopes
and aspirations.
II. DIscRETIoN PREVENTs PREDICTION
It is tempting to characterize the debate as being between individual
decisionmaking made ex ante, people choosing what is best for themselves, and
societal decisionmaking made ex post, judges making decisions about what is best
for people with the benefit of hindsight. Since hindsight is usually better than
foresight, judicial decisionmaking would seem to be superior. But that
characterization of the issue misses an important point: law sets the level of
discretion within which judges operate. If they have narrow discretion, they cannot
tailor a solution to the past behavior and present needs of the couple. Conversely,
if judges have wide discretion, they can tailor solutions for divorcing couples; they
can reach a just result. But that same judicial discretion makes the behavior of the
judges unpredictable to people who are married or contemplating marriage. When
judges have discretion in cases of divorce, people cannot structure their marital
behavior in safe reliance on the law. Because judges have the discretion not to
award spousal support, people take costly (and often needless) steps to protect
themselves against the possibility of future penury. A partner wanting to invest in
homemaking has no way of getting the assurances needed to allow him or her to
make that investment safely.
The response by Abrams and discussion among my several dinner table mates
indicate how hard it is for people to think of the rules of marriage as something for
couples to control. It is ironic that Abrams, a notable critic of patriarchy, should fall
into the same mode of paternalism traditional in law-wise old persons telling us
all what is good for us.
6. See id. at 484-89.
7. This is the "Type A" personality couple.
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III. "PATERNALIST," C'EST MOI?
Another twist in this irony is that Abrams accuses us of paternalism. In her
section entitled "Interrogating Protection," she says, "Their protection is, in the first
instance, paternalist: it seeks to save smart women from foolish choices by
rendering more secure the traditional, gender-differentiated role they had sought in
the first place."' We can interrogate her claim through a hypothetical.
Suppose the law refused to enforce loan repayment agreements made by husbands
who have borrowed money from their wives and, as a result, few wives made loans
to their husbands. And suppose further that I were to argue that the law should be
reformed to make those repayment agreements enforceable. Would Abrams accuse
me of trying to save smart wives from their foolish choices not to lend money? Such
an accusation would make no sense. How could it be a foolish choice not to lend
money when the law refuses to enforce repayment agreements? Equally important,
it would not be foolish to refrain from lending money .even if the law did enforce
loan agreements.
This hypothetical situation is not so far from the status quo. Many women today
refuse to play the traditional role, a role which calls on them to put all of their
efforts into team-making with much of their compensation to come much later in
life. In the past, they stayed home to take care of children, supported their
husbands' careers by helping with both substantive and social aspects of their jobs,
and worked futureless jobs to provide the tuition, room, and board for their
husbands' educations. Such efforts can be good investments, sensible loans to the
marital enterprise. Women still make these "loans," but many feel compelled to
curtail these investments in favor of their own careers. If that is what they would
rather do, that is as it should be. But if they pursue a career against their
preferences in order to achieve life-long income security, we have a problem. The
problem with the law today is not that women are making foolish choices. Most (if
not all) women make smart choices among the available options, but the law gives
them too few options. Eric and I want to give women the option of actually getting
legally enforceable security from husbands who promise security. Because there is
no "foolish choice" being made by women today,9 our proposal could not "save"
women from such a choice. It seems to me that the more "paternalist" position is
the one that denies to women the legal ability to make enforceable bargains about
their marriages."
8. Abrams, supra note 1, at 527-28.
9. 1 admit I am perplexed by Abrams's contention that we are trying to save smart women
from foolish choices. In the discussion above, I assume that she is referring to the women who
choose market employment, which I certainly do not see'as a foolish choice. It is also possible that
Abrams thinks I am trying to save women who choose homemaking, but I do not think that is a
foolish choice either, and I do not understand why the women who choose that would be the
"smart"women. Perhaps my perplexity helps to show that I lack whatever intent she attributes to
US.
10. It is true that we are somewhat paternalistic in that we would place some limits on marital
contracts, just as the law of ordinary contracts is somewhat paternalistic.
1999]
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Ultimately, Abrams is concerned that our proposal does not guarantee protection
for women. Although her concern for women is well justified, guaranteeing
protection was not our goal. Our goal was to increase fairness and efficiency in
marriage, to make marriage more comfortable for all couples, and to make
marriages fit people rather than the other way around.
IV. WHY DoEs ARAMs MISCONSTRUE OUR ARGUMENTS?
It is a common rhetorical tactic to attribute evil motives to the opposition, but it
seems more likely that Abrams has just mistaken our position. This might have
happened for any of a number of reasons. Perhaps Abrams thinks we harbor the
common presumption that naturalness is akin to goodness. If so, that could explain
why she interprets us as desiring to guide women into traditional marriages. But if
that is her presumption, she is wrong. I doubt that a traditional marriage is
"natural." More important, I do not think that what is "natural" has any moral
force." What is (whether natural or not) has no claim to what ought to be."2
Maybe Abrams reads too much into our admitted concern for the plight of
women. She says that we made "arguments for protection."' 3 On this point we may
not have made ourselves plain enough. We do not wish to argue that the law should
protect women. We did say the current law offers them little protection and that they
could probably better protect themselves. But there is an important distinction
between a desire to let women protect themselves through legal agreements and a
desire for society to protect women. That distinction becomes critical when
determining the accuracy of the "paternalist" charge. We want women to be able
to protect themselves the same way homeowners do when they buy insurance or
farmers do when they buy options to sell their pork bellies. If it is not paternalistic
to enforce the insurance and option contracts, it is not paternalistic to enforce an
alimony agreement. If we were trying only to protect women, our analysis would
have been different' 4 Women may (probably will) end up with more security if our
proposed reform is implemented but, if so, they will have provided it for
themselves.
Perhaps the source of Abrams's confusion as to our motives is our acceptance of
the predictable consequences of improving the lot of women that choose traditional
roles. It is true that we want to render traditional marriage more secure for women
who want that security. Put generally, Eric and I want women to have more ways
11. For that reason, I was insensitive to the potential discomfort I might cause some readers
by referring to some crimes as "crimes against nature." I apologize for our using that phrase.
12. It would be difficult, however, to determine what ought to be without assuming something
about what is, such as that there are humans living on an Earth of limited resources.
13. Abrams, supra note 1, at 519.
14. For one thing, we would be obligated to wrestle with the question whether it is reasonable
to think that the law, which is still made and applied disproportionately by males, has much chance
of protecting females well. Moreover, we would have to discuss why the men in power would do
a better job protecting women than would women, as advisors in the contracting process.
(Vol. 74:801
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of achieving security (if they want it"). Our proposal is designed to allow couples
to achieve other goals as well. For example, both to create incentives against fault
and to satisfy a sense ofjustice, a couple may want to empower a court to determine
who is at fault.16 We want women who choose homemaking to be better off
according to their own standards and we want them to be allowed to achieve the
gains from promissory exchanges. On the other hand, I would not turn back the
clock to the old law. That law was ill-suited to the hopes and aspirations of many
women and couples.
I would predict that allowing homemakers increased security via premarital
agreements would increase the number of women choosing homemaking. Based on
that, Abrams probably suspects, correctly, that we consider an increase in
homemaking to be an acceptable consequence of making secure homemaking a
viable option. But my acceptance of the outcome does not mean that I desire it. It
may stretch credulity for me to say that I am neutral on that issue, but I sincerely
think I do not care. 7 I care about whether the law should offer choices, but in the
absence of externalities I do not care which options women (or men) choose.
Anyway, our motives and preferences should be irrelevant. A proposal made by
one with ugly motives is easier to ignore, but in the last analysis the proposal should
stand or fall on its merits. What are those merits? It is certainly possible that finding
legal space for traditional marriages would be harmful. If traditional marriage is an
option, some will probably take it and that might lead to bad consequences. It is
even possible that the mere existence of the option would be harmful even if no one
chooses it. Those are possibilities that we attempted to address in our paper.
V. WHAT Is OUR BURDEN OF PROOF?
Unfortunately, confusion on our goals leads to confusion about the burden of
proof we bear. If we were to begin with the paternalistic assumption that the law
should protect women, we would have to make a case that our proposal would
protect them better than the current law and better than any other likely reform. If
we were to argue that women or couples should choose a traditional marriage, we
would bear a burden of showing that traditional marriage is better for women,
couples, children, or society. Perhaps because Abrams assumes that we are making
an argument that women should choose a traditional option or that we are trying to
"save" and "protect" women, she also assumes that we are obliged to present the
kinds of evidence that would show the traditional option to be better than the
15. In the movie THE WEDDING SNGER (New Line Cinema 1998), Holly tells Robbie to his
surprise that security is important to all people. We do not assume so much. However, we do
assume that there are at least some women who both want security and want to invest in household
production.
16. See generaly AuSIN SARAT & WxLuAm L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIm
CLIENTs: PowRAND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PRocEss (1995) (finding that parties to a divorce
sometimes want the law to determine fault, but that lawyers explain that fault is irrelevant).
17. Evidence that Abrams thinks I care about the marital choices people make (as opposed to
the choices they have) appears in her footnote three. 'f Stake is, in fact, the 'liberal' that he claims
to be, he may be getting more than he bargained for in this particular authorial union." Abrams,
supra note 1, at 518 n.3.
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modem regime. Abrams criticizes us for presenting inadequate evidence to support
various claims because she reads us as claiming more than we did.
VI. OUR CLAIMS WERE OVERSTATED
Expecting us to attempt to present convincing evidence, 8 Abrams takes issue
with our statement that "parents often do a better job educating and nurturing their
children than temporary caretakers." 9 She says,
Can such benefits really be claimed from a gendered[] division of labor in the
family? The answer is far from clear. Though many parents, overwhelmingly
mothers, derive satisfaction from greater involvement in the education and
nurturance of their children,[] there is little evidence that suggests that
preschoolers who go to day care, or school-age children who return home before
their parents, experience emotional or developmental deficits, or underperforin
in subsequent life challenges.'
Our claim was not nearly as strong as Abrams makes it out to be. Even if parents
often do a worse job, it can also be true, as we said, that they often do a better job.
Moreover, it is certainly possible that some parents will know that parental care is
superior for their own children.23 We did not offer evidence on the point because
18. Abrams acknowledges that our employment of a "choice" framework enables us "to
achieve these results with far less argumentative exertion than they would be obliged to undertake
were they to argue outright for a reinvigoration of traditional family roles," Abrams, supra note 1,
at 518, but then criticizes us for not exerting ourselves.
19. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 484.
20. We did not claim that benefits stem "from a gendered division of labor." Abrams, supra
note 1, at 529 (emphasis added). Benefits can arise from any specialization, whether gendered or
not. Specialization occurs in both traditional and non-traditional households. In a marriage of a
male and a female any division of labor will by necessity be a division by sex and, in the real world
today, most couples would assign more child care to the mother. I would be just as happy if it were
otherwise. Our argument defended specialization, not gendered specialization.
21. It is not clear what Abrams means by "greater involvement" Greater than what? I agree
with her if she means that most primary caregivers are mothers and that they derive satisfaction
from it. I would disagree, however, if she means that most fathers do not derive additional
satisfaction from additional involvement
22. Abrams, supra note 1, at 529.
23. The study by Margaret O'Brien Caughy et al., Day-Care Participation As a Protective
Factor in the Cognitive Development ofLow-Income Children, 65 CkILD DEv. 457 (1994), cited
by Abrams in footnote 35, indicates that some groups of children are likely to develop better in
reading and math with parental care than with day-care, Abrams, supra note 1, at 529 n35.
There are other ways in-which children might benefit from having a parent at home. For
example, there is evidence that the number of hours worked by mothers is inversely and
significantly related to the affection children have for their fathers twelve years later. See PAUL R.
AMATO &ALANBOOii, A GENERATIONATRiSK 253 tbls3.4, 3.5 (1997). Moreover, divorce has
negative consequences for children, including later unhappiness in marriage. See, e.g., id. at 260
tbl.4.6. Our proposal should increase specialization within marriage and increase investment in
marriage-specific skills. As Mark Ramseyer points out, this increases the payoff from staying
married relative to divorcing and decreases the risk of divorce. . Mark Ramseyer, Toward
Contractual Choice in Marriage, 73 IND. L.. 511, 515 (1998). But compare Margaret F. Brinig
& FR Buckley, No-FaultLaws andAt-FaultPeople, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 325 (1998), with
Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and
[Vol. 74:801
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for us to be wrong it would have to be true that children rarely receive better care
from their parents than from day-care employees. "
Abrams expands our claim to attack it, but in doing so misses the central point
of our push to privatize the rules of marriage. It might be only a minority of couples
that would think that they would care for their children better than a non-relative.
Privatization allows a minority to live their desired lives without forcing a change
in lifestyle on the majority. Once again, Abrams appears to make the mistake of
thinking that we, flowing in the strong current of tradition in family law, are trying
to set a standard or norm for everyone to follow when instead we are swimming
upstream. We want to let people choose for themselves whether to stay at home and
care for children or engage in market production, even if only a small minority think
they would give better care than a temporary caregiver.
Moreover, contrary to Abrams's implication, we made no claims about deficits,
emotional, developmental, or otherwise, arising from non-parental care. Within a
wide range, which I imagine Abrams would happily grant, it is up to parents to
decide whether day-care or parent-care is best for their children. As long as there
is no strong scientific evidence that parent-care is harmful, both choices should be
allowed. Our point is that the law ought to facilitate, rather than impede, parental
choice.
Abrams says that "the benefits to children from legal support of the traditional
family form may, in fact, be illusory."" Indeed, they may be. But that says little. If
the benefits to children are in fact all illusory, then it is right to discourage parents
from making that choice, as current law does. But if some benefits might accrue to
some children, then parents ought to have the legal option to seek those benefits and
to trade off some other interests in doing so.
Abrams also says that Eric and I "assume[] a unity of interest between at least
some subset of mothers and children."2 That is wrong. There are good reasons,
including some biological, to presume that mothers and children do not have a
"unity" of interest. For that reason and others, we agree that children cannot protect
themselves, and therefore must be protected by the state. We do not propose to
change current law regarding children (support, neglect, abuse, custody, visitation,
parental authority, adoption, etc.) whether their parents are single, married, or
divorced.
As a final example of Abrams's misconstruction of our points, consider our
speculation that liberalizing divorce law may have widened the attractiveness of
conservative religion. Abrams responds, "This claim strikes me as dubious ....
[T]heir evidence does not demonstrate that the support of religious communities is
being sought out by irreligious members of traditional families who would
Divorce Rates, 18 INT'LREV. L. & EcoN. 341 (1998), regarding empirical evidence on whether
unilateral no-fault affects divorce rates. Recognizing these connections, a couple contemplating
marriage might rationally thinkthat contractually requiring mutual agreement before divorce would
increase the happiness of their children.
24. Abrams, supra note 1, at 519.
25.Id.
1999]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
otherwise have little interest in affiliating with these communities." 6 But what was
our "claim"? We said merely that conservatization was a "curious possibility. 2 7 A
"claim" that something could be true does not require evidence that it is true.
Moreover, it is true that people can visibly increase their costs of divorce by
associating themselves closely with an organization that will ostracize them if they
initiate a divorce. Because associating with such an organization might be a sign of
willingness to make a marital commitment, it would not be irrational for persons
looking for others willing to commit to look for them in such organizations.2" If
there are no legal avenues to marital commitment, people might find other roads.
VII. WHAT Is Tim QUESTION AND WHAT ARE THE MERITS OF
THE CASE?
Professor Abrams says "the question is not 'Is the traditional family form so
objectionable we should prevent couples from choosing it?' It is, rather: 'Is the
traditional family form so valuable that we should risk these consequences in order
to reinvigorate it?"" 9 This shift in the question is a deft rhetorical move which, if
accepted, indeed leads to different policy analysis. But is her characterization of the
issue correct? I think not The difference between allowing traditional marriage and
reinvigorating it lies at the heart of the fight between private choice and
governmental control. Reinvigoration suggests (although it does not necessarily
require) apurpose of increasing the frequency of traditional marriage. As Abrams
recognizes, I have no such goal.3" Merely allowing people to construct the kind of
marriage they want suggests a different purpose, one of keeping my and society's
notions of "proper" relationships out of the picture.
Setting aside the rhetorical move, Abrams is right that consequences could
convince us that the benefits of allowing private choice are not worth its costs. But
Abrams does not give us evidence that women in traditional marriages are worse
off than women in market production. In terms of leisure time available to them, the
evidence is just the opposite.3 She does say that enforcing these agreements will
"send a signal that women's growing autonomy in relation to family should be
reconsidered, and that more institutional support should be given to family forms
26. Abrams, supra note 1, at 527 n29. It is not clear to me why Abrams presumes that we
assume that "irreligious" people would be the ones attracted to fundamental religions. It seems to
me much more likely that the people drawn in would be those who are already religious.
27. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 463.
28. In principle, non-religious organizations could play the same role. For example, a'Warried
for Life" society could similarly threaten ostracism for those who ask for a divorce. And the society
could require membership dues, which would be used to create a fund to support members who
were divorced without their consent One important threat the society could not make, however,
would be the threat of eternal damnation.
29. Abrams, supra note 1, at 519.
30. Abrams, supra note 1, at 518 n.3.
31. For a review of the evidence that there is a more equal division of leisure time between
husbands and wives when women work in the home than when they work for wages in addition
to working in the home, see Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a
Futurefor Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA.L. REv. 509, 519 (1998).
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entailing greater dependency for women."32 She presents no evidence for the
puzzling contention that enforcing the family-related agreements of women (which
assumes they have the capacity to contract for themselves as autonomous persons)
will send a signal that their growing autonomy regarding family matters should be
reconsidered. Rather, enforcing individualized agreements instead of imposing
predefined family relationships helps women to achieve autonomy. As for the signal
regarding institutional support, Eric and I do want more legal enforcement of
agreements and that enforcement could give legal institutional support to
relationships that involve female "dependency." The next, and missing, step in the
argument against free choice for women is the explanation of when and why
"dependency" is harmful.
VIII. Is DEPENDENCY BAD?
Abrams's discussion of "dependency" reveals great antipathy for it, although it
is somewhat ambiguous as to what sorts of dependency are bad. Her underlying
assumption could be that women should not be dependent on men. If that is her
position, I cannot join. Self-sufficiency is outmoded. It was popular with the hippies
of the sixties and maintains a following in the survivalists of today. But life is
better, with greater safety and more time for leisure and possibly even increased job
satisfaction, when we specialize in production and trade for things we do not
produce.33 Suppose I can milk a cow at one gallon per hour and bake a loaf of bread
in a half-hour. Being a better worker, Eric can milk a gallon in one-half an hour and
bake a loaf in twenty-five minutes. Suppose also that each of our families needs
three loaves of bread and two gallons of milk per day. Avoiding dependency on
Eric, I can provide these staples with three and one-half hours of work per day. Eric
will work two hours and fifteen minutes. If we accept interdependency, I can bake
for three hours, Eric can milk for two hours, we can trade three loaves for two
gallons, and we will each have saved some time for stitching our clothes, patching
our roofs, or playing with our children. Interdependence is not a bad thing.34
It would be possible to train ourselves initially to be self-sufficient, preserving
our potential for independence, and then become specialists as well. But that would
be a waste of time. Almost all of us are heavily dependent on others in many ways.
We need people for emotional, physical, and financial security. Let's accept it.
Once we accept interdependence and specialization, it makes little sense to spend
time learning self-sufficiency, except as a form of leisure.
Abrams says that society values dependence-and interdependence-even less
than it did in the heyday of the traditional family. Even if that unsupported
statement is true, society's bias against interdependence can hardly be a reason to
prevent people from choosing it, except under an assumption of extreme
32. Abrams, supra note 1, at 518.
33. The benefits of specialization are not limited to capitalist economies.
34. In addition to increasing peacetime happiness, interdependence also makes it harder for us
to go to war.
35. Abrams, supra note 1, at 519.
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paternalism. Surely legally enforceable financial interdependence is not so bad for
couples or society that we should prevent couples from choosing it.
Since interdependence is generally sensi~le, perhaps only a special form of
dependence troubles Abrams. I presume that she does not mind wives and husbands
being emotionally dependent on each other. She might be bothered, however, by the
prospect of wives being financially dependent on their husbands. The question then
is whether being financially dependent on a husband is any worse than being
financially dependent on employers and bankers, who are also often men. I think so.
Dependence on husbands is worse than dependence on male fiduciaries. A husband-
dependent wife takes a large gamble with her future. She depends on his
beneficence and has no legal recourse if he breaches his obligations. She cannot sue
her husband for breach of his duties the way she can sue her banker. The status quo
is bad for women who choose interdependence.
The position against choice presented by Abrams reduces the security of women
in order to give them an incentive to be independent. This is not an accidental
result. Women will never be fully independent if they can be secure without
working; providing security to women will necessarily reduce their incentives to
develop careers. Anyone who wants women to be independent must oppose security
for interdependent women. This position is very paternalistic (or maternalistic)36
because such a person does not want women to get what they want, but wants
women to get what is good for them. Unfortunately, the consequences of the
position go beyond mere paternalism. It would be one thing for society to provide
a carrot for women to seek indep'endence. The position taken by Abrams against
security via traditional marriage uses the stick of insecurity to influence the
behavior of women. And look at the cost! Some women in fact suffer insecurity so
that others will enjoy[?] independence.
Of course, Abrams does not want any women to feel insecure. She recognizes that
we are in what Margaret Jane Radin would call a double bind. 7 In Abrams's view,
women choose dependence on men because it is the best of some bad options.
These women's options are poor because of current background conditions,
including the market rewards for women's labor, the low level of community
support for children and mothers, and the social norms encouraging women to play
certain roles." According to Professor Radin, if one argues for foreclosing a bad
choice, such as prostitution, on the grounds that the choice is only attractive when
background conditions make other choices worse, then one has a responsibility to
36. Perhaps "parentalist" would satisfy the criterion of sex neutrality, although I am not sure
sex-neutrality is called for in this instance.
37. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HiARV. L. REv. 1849, 1916-17 (1987).
38. I am reminded of the short story by KURT VoNNEGUT, JR., All the King's Horses, in
WmcoMTO TimMoNiY House 84 (1968). In that story, Colonel Bryan Kelly's family will be
killed by a Communist guerrilla leader, Pi Ying, unless Kelly plays a game of chess in which the
members of Kelly's family and 12 American soldiers are pieces in the game. As the game
progresses, Kelly is faced with the abominable option of sacrificing his son, Jerry (a king's knight),
to save the rest of the captives. See id. at 95-96. The world of limited options created by Pi Ying
is a far cry from just or happy. However, neither justice nor happiness would be served by further
constraining Kelly from making the awful sacrifice that might save the others. Likewise, it does
not increase justice or happiness to reduce the options available to women.
[Vol. 74:801
LAW OF MARRJAGE
advocate for a change in the background conditions. 9 And indeed, Abrams argues
for changing those conditions,"0 although she has not put forth in her brief response
any concrete proposal for change. Abrams rightly says that if background conditions
were improved, the availability of better choices would make homemaking much
less attractive.
41
I am no defender of the status quo. But, however bad, the status quo is the status
quo. The one thing that can be said for it is that it is possible. The same cannot be
said for the preconditions to Abrams's solution to the insecurity of women. There
is no realistic possibility of soon changing the fundamental social and economic
fabric of the United States in the ways that would be necessary to substantially
improve women's options, and foreclosing options just makes the situation worse. 2
Put another way, I am happy to concede that our proposal would create a world that
is worse than a utopia Abrams can imagine. It may be a second best solution, but
it is better than any alternative that has a decent chance of becoming reality.43
Rather than trying to make women financially independent of their husbands, the
realistic solution is to give women recourse for breaches of their husbands'
promises. If we enforce the agreements between men and women, women will not
be at the mercy of their husbands because women can sue them, just like their
bankers, when the men fail to live up to the deals they have made.4 ' The refusal of
the law to intervene in disputes (in any domain) advantages the physically powerful
and independent Conversely, increasing the scope of enforceable law benefits those
with less muscle.
IX. DIFFERENCES IN "BARGAINING POWER' JUSTIFY LrrmE
Abrams says, "The proposed regime appears likely to enforce many marital
contracts that are the product of inequalities in bargaining power,"'" and later,
"inequalities of power among cross-sex, or heterosexual, couples, mean that we
may rightly be suspicious of the terms on which [their] differences are resolved."' 6
There are a number of responses to this. One is to interrogate the concept of
39. "P]ustice requires that we consider changing the circumstances that create the dilemma.
We must consider wealth and power redistribution." Radin, supra note 37, at 1917.
40. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 522-23.
41. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 521.
42. As Radin says, "[Market-inalienabilities are unjust when they are too harmful to
personhood in our nonideal world." Radin supra note 37, at 1937.
43. Perhaps ."impracticable" best describes her solution. Her goal may be higher, but the
chances of achieving it are so much lower that my lower goal has a higher expected value.
44. Because most husbands' pockets are shallower than bankers', women with a cause of
action against their former husbands will not be perfectly secure. But many will be more secure
than if they did not have a cause of action. Moreover, women who "lend" to their husbands can
reduce the risk that their husbands will not be able to repay at the time of divorce (or after). One
way women can make the loan safer is to negotiate an agreement that the husband will repay the
loan (with more than half of his income) as soon as he has ajob rather than at the time of divorce.
This will work best if courts enforce contracts for repayment during marriage.
45. Abrams, supra note 1, at 518.
46. Id. at 520.
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"bargaining power." This widely used phrase lacks a well-accepted definition.47 It
can be used to express a number of possible differences between two parties to an
agreement, including differences in physical power and economic strength or
position. Defined by reference to ability to bargain, it could refer to a difference in
information, mental acuity, skill at perceiving self-interest, facility for ignoring
interests of others, training in negotiation, or even capacity to enjoy the bargaining
process. In the alternative, "bargaining power" could refer to the position of the
bargainer, rather than her abilities. Perhaps the person with the most economic
assets has the greater bargaining power. I prefer to think that the person with
greater "bargaining power" is the person who would gain less utility from the deal
and is correspondingly less eager to make any concessions. For example, a person's
bargaining power could be measured by the difference between the other party's
reservation price and most recent offer. If I offer to sell you my car for $11 and my
reservation price (the least I would take) is $10, you do not have much power to
improve the bargain. Assuming each of the various possible definitions, one could
argue about whether men have greater "power" than women and whether that
difference makes a convincing normative justification for a judge to ignore the
agreed exchange. On the average, men do have more physical strength than women.
It is not clear, however, how that power difference would result in an unfair bargain
if thd power was not used against the woman at the time of bargaining."
But we do not have to argue that women have the same or greater "bargaining
power" or that bargaining power is a nearly useless concept in order to argue that
women would be better off if their bargains were enforced. First, obviously,
bargains can be good for both parties even when the gains from trade are shared
unequally, which must be the vastly more frequent case. One of the points Robert
Axelrod makes is that in situations where cooperation between two persons can
lead to gains, envy by one of the two can lead to reduced cooperation, to the
detriment of both parties.49 A person can do very well by cooperating often even if
he gets less than the other party in every one of his cooperative relationships.
Arguments based on "unequal bargaining power" fail to recognize that it is often
much more important that the parties cooperate than that they split the gains down
the middle, if that were even possible.
Second, in any divorce or continuing marriage, bargains are and always will be
struck, both expressly and impliedly. The key issue for women is whether women
would be better off with judicial enforcement of bargains struck later in marriage
or at divorce than with bargains struck earlier in marriage or before. Viewed in
Abrams's terms of "entrenching inequality, 50 the issue is whether there is more
inequality at the time of the initial agreement or later. We need to ask, then, whether
47. See Wax, supra note 31, at 543 (citing ALAN WERTEIMBR, EXPLOITATION 64-68 (1996),
to the effect that "'bargaining power' is rarely understood or precisely defined"). Waxdiscusses
bargaining power as a function of the attractiveness of outside options and the psychological or
strategic advantages that determine how gains from trade are divided.
48. If physical power had been exercised during bargaining we and most judges would have
no trouble ignoring the agreement
49. ROBERT AXBLROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 110-12 (1984).
50. Abrams, supra note 1, at 520.
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there are any ways in which the bargaining power of women increases during
marriage or at divorce.
Perhaps women have a greater deficit in sophistication at the time of marriage.
Do men develop an ability to look out for themselves earlier in life, with women
catching up later, after the usual time of first marriage? If so, it might serve the
interests of women to refuse, as the law now sometimes does, to uphold agreements
made by young couples. I think the premise is false. I see no evidence in my law
students that young men are more mature or sensible.
Another consideration is the ability to be ruthlessly self-interested during
bargaining. Some might argue that women are less likely to be ruthless, but that
does not matter. The question is whether their deficit in ruthlessness, if they have
one, will wax or wane during marriage. I see no reason to believe that husbands'
devotion increases more during marriage than the devotion of wives. If that is
correct, then this other-regarding-preference factor does not support the view that
informal agreements made during marriage would be better for women than
contracts made before marriage.
It is a closer case at divorce. It is possible that women's deficit in ruthlessness
is smaller at divorce than at the time of marriage. If so, then this is a reason to
believe that enforcing premarital contracts would worsen the condition of divorced
women." There are a couple of counterpoints, however. For one, in many marriages
there are children. Mothers may generally have a stronger attachment to their
children and may feel that minor children would do better with maternal custody.
If so, they might be more willing than fathers to trade away their own security for
custody. In addition, if women care more about the feelings of their children, they
might be less willing to be ruthless in bargaining because making their father feel
bad might make her children feel bad. Mothers might be more anxious to be fair for
the sake of the children. In cases involving children, women could be less likely to
fend well for themselves than they would have been before marriage. The interests
of their children would often be served by women continuing in otherwise unhappy
marriages or agreeing to otherwise disagreeable terms of divorce. In marriages
without children, women may become more involved with and committed to their
partners and may find it harder to be ruthless even in the context of divorce.
It has been suggested to me that women could help themselves by changing their
preferences to be less intertwined, less other-regarding. There is no reason,
however, to believe that such a change would make women happier. We can assume
for the sake of argument that women who cared less about others would assert their
own interests more filly during bargaining. We can also assume that their stronger
assertion of interests would result in their acquiring more assets or an otherwise
more favorable division of the gains from trade. And we can assume that under
either preference set, before or after the change, having more material goods yields
more happiness. Although the change would make men less happy, those
assumptions are not enough to imply that women would be happier. We cannot, at
least with theory alone, compare the situations because women would have different
51. By this light, law reform may have started backwards, where women need it least Freedom
ofcontract applies in the context of contracts regarding the consequences of divorce. Yet divorce
is the situation where women might be most able to protect themselves.
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preferences. Women could be less happy being selfish and rich than they were
being unselfish and poor.
Other-regarding considerations are not the only important factor in the bargaining
inequality. Even if the ruthlessness gap narrows over time, in other ways the
bargaining position of women weakens. Until the miracles of modem medicine give
women equal power to start families at an advanced age, women's options to
remarry will diminish faster over time than do men's. Having poorer options
outside the marriage could lead to weaker bargaining power within it. For these
reasons, it is possible that, with the help of other women (including counselors),
women could make deals that would put them in a better position than they
currently enjoy (or don't).
Finally, being able to describe circumstances in which a woman's bargaining
power deficit diminishes with age does not justify a conclusion that all youthful
bargains ought not be enforced. The conclusion better serving the interests of
women would be that we ought to restrict non-enforcement of early agreements to
those circumstances where women gain relative bargaining power with time. Even
if those cases are not rare, they should not undermine enforcement of all
agreements. Only if the bargaining power of women increases during marriage and
divorce in the overwhelming majority of cases should we take the blunderbuss
approach of refusing to enforce all agreements relating to marriage.
In sum, whether women are better off bargaining early depends on the net effects.
If, over time, women lose more bargaining power than they gain, early agreements
entrench a lesser inequality than a woman will suffer later. Considering only my self
interest from halfway behind the veil, 2 if I were to choose whether to cut a deal
with my wife at age 25 or when we are both 55, I would choose the latter without
much hesitation. Assuming divorce was likely and that its grounds and terms could
be negotiated in advance, it would surprise me if most women would advise their
daughters to wait until later in life to hammer out the important details.
Abrams argues that men can get out of premarital bargains because their wives
have lost bargaining power.53 I think not. Assuming, as she does for this argument,
that a woman loses relative bargaining power with time, how can she possibly be
worse off with an initial entitlement that she negotiated when she had more power
than she would be without that legally enforceable entitlement? How much it will
improve her lot at divorce is hard to say, but it is inconceivable to me that having
an enforceable agreement will not help her in some way. Even if she chooses to
trade away some of her contractual rights in return for something else (such as
custody), at least she has something to trade away. An innocent woman deals from
a position of greater strength when she has the power to veto a divorce (for
example) than if she does not have that power.
Amy Wax devotes much attention to the question of bargaining power.5 4 In
explaining why men have more bargaining power, she emphasizes men's longer
reproductive life and greater opportunity to go a "second round" in marriage. She
52. By "halfway behind the veil," I mean that I know myself to be a male, but know nothing
else.
53. Abrams, supra note 1, at 532.
54. Wax, supra note 31, at 541-43.
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discusses why premarital bargains may be detrimental to men's willingness to
marry and to the marriage market for women. Although premarital contracts may
stem the decline in bargaining power that follows after women make the first
investment, widespread use of these contracts might move the marriage market to
a new equilibrium in which women will have to wait even longer to marry and will
have to settle for less desirable husbands. Nevertheless, Professor Wax agrees with
me that the best time for women to bargain is at the outset of marriage and that,
even given a biological, social, and cultural background that is on average tilted
against women (that is, given gender inequality as a fact of marriage), we ought to
remove arbitrary impediments to women's maximizing their security through
contract.
Abrams is right that discrimination and segregation on the job, as well as the
expression of social norms relating to women's roles, make market production less
attractive than it would be without those harmful behaviors.55 The current legal
regime, which makes household production unattractive by making it insecure, has
the salutary effect of equalizing downward so that all choices look bad. If we make
household production more secure, it will look better. The important thing to keep
in mind is that it will look better because it will be better. 6 Women will choose
household production because they predict that it will make them happier. I cannot
accept the argument that we ought to keep homemaking women in miserable
insecurity so that women will choose instead to work discriminatory and unfair jobs.
X. BAD WAGES FOLLOW BAD ALTERNATIVES
In her argument against enforcing agreements that make marriages more
financially secure for women, Abrams points to differences in wages as evidence
that men and women do not have equal bargaining power. A difference in wages for
equal work, equal marginal product, could be due in part to the fact that marriage
is less secure for women than for men. Suppose that, for whatever non-legal reason,
women are generally more reliable mates than men. If men are more willing to
divorce their spouses when a better mate appears to be available, women cannot
rely as heavily on their spouses for financial support as can men. If that is the case,
men can hold out for larger wages, with less fear of losing their jobs because their
wives will still support them even if they lose their jobs. He would not live as
affluently, but the husband who tells his boss to "stuff it" probably will not starve.
Women, on the other hand, will take the same job at a lower wage because holding
out for a greater wage is doubly dangerous. If a wife becomes unemployed, she
increases the chances that some other woman will look more attractive to her
55. Abrams, supra note 1, at 520.
56. Abrams says, 'Terhaps the greatest danger of this proposal is its explicit-message that
female dependency can be made secure in a society where this is no longer feasible (if indeed it
everwas)." Abrams, supra note 1, at 533 (parenthetical in original). Surely no reasonable reader
would read Eric and me to say that all the sources of insecurity can be abolished by the
enforcement of a well-written premarital agreement We merely contend that enforcing some
premarital agreements can make women who choose homemaking more secure than they are now
and, for them, that might be an important improvement.
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husband, increasing the chances she will be on her own without a job.57 Thus, if
men are socially or innately less reliable spouses, the legal insecurity created by
unilateral divorce law lowers the reservation price for women selling their labor to
employers more than it does for men. In employment situations where wages are set
by employers bargaining with employees over how to divide the gains from trade
(that is, where employees are not paid their marginal product)," the lower
reservation price of women could easily result in lower wages.
It is thus possible that women's wages are lower than men's in part because of
the weaker position from which they bargain with employers. That is not, however,
a sufficient reason to oppose our proposal for allowing contracting on the terms of
marriage and divorce. Indeed, by increasing the reliability of husbands more than
wives, contracts that require mutual consent for divorce could raise the minimum
for which women are willing to work and thereby increase women's wages.
As another possibility, suppose that a woman thinks that the next best alternative
to her paying job is homemaking while her husband thinks that the next best
alternative to his paying job is a different paying job, with homemaking not even
close. Suppose also that a contract eliminating the possibility of unilateral divorce
will increase the financial security of the homemaking option. In such cases, the
contract would increase the employment reservation price for the woman, but might
not for her husband. If she is currently paid less than men for the same work and
both are paid below marginal productivity, she can increase the amount she
demands from her employer without her employer hiring men to do her job because
the men would be even more expensive. The wife's wages could increase if she
demands more for her time. Once again, we see that a contract dealing with the
grounds for divorce could improve the position from which a wife bargains and
increase her market wage. In sum, if women's marriage options are better, and if
women want financial security and can get it through an enforceable no-urfilateral-
divorce contract with a husband, there is a possibility that women will demand more
for their labor and their wages will rise.
As a third possibility, suppose that men and women are not perfectly substitutable
in employment, but are instead two different factors in production. Then, all else
equal, the greater the supply of women, the lower their marginal product. By
decreasing the security of marriage, unilateral no-fault divorce increases the supply
of women. This shifts the women's labor supply curve to the right and decreases
their equilibrium wage. A fourth possibility is that women are more risk averse than
men. If so, they would forego some wage increase for a reduced chance of total
unemployment.
There may be ways of empirically testing these theoretical mechanisms by which
divorce law might affect wages. First, as both of the first two scenarios above
57. One might argue that there is another potential reason for women to bargain less strongly.
Women might perceive that their income would drop more than their husbands', after divorce, so
even with the same chance of divorce, its expected cost is higher. But this factor, that women are
more worried about divorce, cuts both ways. Women would be more eager to have ajob and so
might bargain weakly, but they would also be more concerned that the job pay well because they
might rely on it entirely. It is not clear what the net effect would be.
58. Economists and lawyers might differ in their opinions regarding how often wages are
below the employee's marginal productivity.
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depended on the assumption that wages were below marginal productivity, we
should see a greater difference between the wages of women and men in industries
or jobs where wages are set by individual bargaining. Conversely, we should see
less of a sex difference in occupations where there is a large supply of basically
fungible employees. We might expect to see a lower wage difference where there
is lower asset specificity and, as a first cut, that might be where employers are
larger companies. Second, it is possible that some states provide more security in
homemaking by giving the homemaker more property or alimony at divorce. I
would predict that in those states, women's wages are higher.
XI. OuR DIFFERENCES REGARDING RENEGOTIATION ARE
MoRE PERSPECTIVAL AND JUDGMENTAL THAN ANALYTICAL
Even on the point that divides us, the point that made us fodder for Abrams's
comedic cannon, Eric and I are not as far apart as Abrams seems to think. I
acknowledge that giving couples the power to commit themselves irrevocably can
have some incentive benefits for their marriage;59 it might even improve the chances
that the marriage will be a happy one. On the other hand, Eric agrees that if the
marriage does not work out it is possible that the parties would be happier either
single or married to others. In other words, even after marriage there may be gains
from trade; there are efficient divorces.6"
One difference between Eric and me lies in how much we think akrasia is a
problem. Like Greg Alexander,6" I believe the source of the desire to divorce is
weakness of will much less often than it is a change in preferences or recognition
of an initial mistake or simple opportunism. But even assuming akrasia is a
problem, I think there are good ways of increasing the costs of divorce that will
create the desired incentives without raising the price of divorce to infinity. For
example, a couple could create a divorce penalty for themselves by setting an
irrevocable trust that would be paid to a charity upon their divorce. Another way
to reduce the net gains from divorce is to reduce the benefits of divorce rather than
raising its costs. The benefits of divorce can be reduced by imposing a delay before
it becomes effective. Although either approach can be made to reduce the net gains
from divorce to whatever (non-negative) level the parties desire, I prefer the former
technique over the latter. The delay reduces net social utility while the trust
payment is a mere transfer, it reduces utility of divorce to the couple without
reducing net social utility. If irrevocable trusts are available, couples do not need
to bar divorce entirely in order to control for their weakness of will.62
59. There are harmful incentives too, however, such as the incentive to manufacture evidence
of fault for the purpose of defrauding judges.
60. In an earlier article, I noted a difference between "incentive effects" and "status effects"
ofjudicial decisions. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects ofJudicial Decisions,
79 GEo.LJ. 1447 (1991). As is clear from the point here, decisions by persons other than judges
can have "status" and "incentive" effects.
61. Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits ofPrivate Ordering,
73 Ihm. L.J. 503, 506-07 (1998).
62.Note, however, that any impediment created to prevent inefficient divorce can also deter
efficient divorce, such as by couples for whom the marriage was a mutual mistake.
1999]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Another difference between Eric and me is our judgment as to whether parties
have enough information to make a "no-divorce-allowed" choice wisely. On this
point, I am admittedly paternalistic (although no more so than the current law).
Many people marrying for the first time cannot see just how wrong a marriage can
go and how miserable a couple can be. I might be willing to allow persons who
have been divorced to choose an irrevocable marriage, although I doubt they would
do so.63
CONCLUSION
Current law allows opportunism after marriage.64 This possibility of opportunism
can have important consequences for the investment of couples in their marriage.65
Women (and men) could reduce the potential opportunism if they could hold each
other to contracts,66 that is to say, if they were freer to define their own marriages.
The current law presents a menu of options to people contemplating marriage, but
there is only one item on the pages titled "grounds-for-divorce" and "terms-of-
marriage." The issue we raised is whether to offer more entreds on those pages.
Scholars (and state legislatures) have made numerous proposals, but they cannot
agree on one "best" law for everyone because there is no such thing. The menu of
options should include all of the serious proposals. Since almost anything that can
be written into law can be written into an agreement, one way to offer all of the
good proposals is to allow private contracting. Those who argue against putting
items on the menu, against private contracting, need to make the paternalistic case
that people will choose badly for themselves. As long as a couple does not cast
negative externalities on us, why should we care about how they structure their
relationship? The heavy burden lies with those who oppose freedom of contract to
say why marrying parties ought not be allowed to vary their agreements according
to their preferences and aspirations.
63. It would be an interesting study to see whether persons who have been married and
divorced would seriously entertain the thought of an irrevocable marriage.
64. Current law allows inefficient divorces as well as efficient divorces.
65. See Ramseyer, supra note 23, at 515.
66. On this pointAlexander saysthat men who are asked to agree to a contract restricting exit
will lookfor a "different, more 'pliable' partner." Alexander, supra note 61, at 508. I think it is a
good result of our proposal that men who will not commit will end up marrying women who do
not consider commitment to be essential.
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